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IV.29. PANDANGAN KONTEMPORER TENTANG FIQH                (3/4)
Telaah Problematika hukum Islam di Zaman Modern
 
Oleh Nurcholish Madjid
 
BEBERAPA CONTOH PEMIKIRAN KONTEMPORER FIQH
 
Kita  telah  pergi  sejauh  yang  diperlukan,  untuk  membahas
masalah-masalah  pokok  yang  mendasari  pemikiran kontemporer
tentang  fiqh.  Berbagai  pemikiran  mutakhir   tentang   fiqh
menegaskan  perlunya  kesadaran akan pesan dasar Islam sebelum
suatu hukum atau hukuman  dilaksanakan.  Kesadaran  itu  dapat
disebut  sebagai  karakteristik pemikiran fiqh dan hukum Islam
di zaman modern. Di sini  akan  dikemukakan  contoh  pemikiran
para   intelektual   Islam  mutakhir,  dari  tiga  tokoh  yang
representatif, yaitu Fat'hi 'Utsman (pemimpin redaksi  majalah
Islam  internasional  Arabia  yang terbit di London), Muhammad
Asad (salah seorang  arsitek  dan  pemikir  konstitusi  Negara
Islam  Pakistan),  dan Ahmad Zaki Yamani (yang pernah menjabat
Menteri Perminyakan Saudi Arabia  dan  tokoh  OPEC  yang  amat
terkenal).
 
Fatthi  'Utsman  menegaskan,  suatu  hukum,  termasuk yang ada
dalam al-Qur'an dapat dilaksanakan hanya setelah ditegakkannya
keadilan  sosial  dan  tatanan  kemasyarakatan  yang  menjamin
anggotanya untuk tidak melanggar  ketentuan  yang  ditetapkan.
Kami  kutipkan  dan  terjemahkan  sepenuhnya  pendapat  Fat'hi
'Utsman yang relevan, dari bukunya, al-Din li al-Waqi'  (Agama
untuk Realita):
 
Keadilan  Sosial  sebelum  hukuman.  Allah  menerangkan  dalam
Kitab-Nya berbagai hukuman kejahatan (had) seperti,  misalnya,
hukum  bunuh  (qishash)  untuk  kejahatan  pembunuhan,  potong
tangan untuk pencurian, dan lain-lainnya.  Wajar  bahwa  Islam
menempuh jalan penetapan hukum-hukum setelah ditempuhnya jalan
pengarahan pikiran melalui aqidah dan pendidikan tingkah  laku
melalui  prinsip  tabadul.  Tapi  penetapan  hukum Islam tidak
pernah disebut  kecuali  mesti  timbul  dalam  pikiran  orang,
gambaran  yang  mengerikan  tentang  tangan-tangan buntung dan
jasad-jasad berserakan. Sedangkan yang sebenarnya ialah  bahwa
rahmat  Allah untuk sekalian alam tidaklah menetapkan hukuman,
kecuali sesudah ditempuh  jalan  proteksi,  sama  dengan  yang
dikatakan  Francis  Aveling dalam bukunya ilmu Jiwa Klasik dan
Modern, "Kalau tujuan kita  ialah  kebaikan  masyarakat,  maka
tujuan  hukuman  haruslah proteksi. Dan cara apapun yang dapat
merealisasikan tujuan ini harus dipandang sebagai  wajar  dari
sudut   pandangan   sosial.  Jadi  jika  kita  dapat  mencegah
sebab-sebab dan situasi yang mendorong  kejahatan,  baik  yang
berasal  dari  lingkungan  atau pun dari pribadi sendiri, maka
itulah cara yang ideal yang kita wajib menggunakannya."
 
   Dalam praktek memang telah terjadi berbagai usaha ke
   arah ini melalui berbagai pengabdian sosial. Tapi kalau
   seandainya seluruh situasi yang berkaitan dengan
   lingkungan telah tersedia dengan sebaik-baiknya, maka
   tentulah yang tersisa bagi kita ialah memikirkan
   sebab-sebab individual yang mendorong orang untuk
   melakukan pelanggaran-pelanggaran.
   
   Dari sini kita melihat, Islam ketika menetapkan
   pelaksanaan qishash dalam kejahatan pembunuhan, ia
   bersama itu juga menetapkan langkah-langkah yang
   menjamin hilangnya dorongan-dorongan permusuhan
   golongan, kelompok atau perbedaan tingkat sosial. Dan
   ketika menetapkan hukuman potong tangan pencuri, maka
   Islam tidaklah melakukan hal itu sebelum tegaknya
   hak-hak hidup pribadi dan mantapnya tanggung negara
   untuk menjamin hak-hak pribadi itu. Dan ketika Islam
   menetapkan hukum rajam atau cambuk atas pezina, maka
   sesungguhnya ia juga menetapkan kemudahan jalan
   perkawinan dan melindungi bagian-bagian privat dari
   tubuh dengan menutup aurat dan menjaga penglihatan
   mata, serta melarang khalwat (kencan seorang lelaki dan
   seorang perempuan yang bukan muhrim, namun tanpa muhrim
   perempuan itu). Jadi pengaturan sosial berjalan seiring
   atau mendahului penetapan hukuman kejahatan.[29]
 
Lebih runtut lagi  adalah  jalan  pikiran  dan  garis  argumen
Muhammad  Asad.  Dalam  memberi  penjelasan tentang makna yang
lebih mendasar di balik hukuman yang amat keras  bagi  pencuri
(potong  tangan),  Asad membuat uraian panjang lebar. (Di sini
kami kutipkan seluruh uraian  itu,  namun  maaf  tidak  sempat
menerjemahkan):
 
   The extreme severity of this Qur'anic punishment can be
   understood only if one bears in mind the fundamental
   principle of Islamic Law that no duty (taklif) is ever
   imposed on man without his being granted a coresponding
   right (haq); and the term "duty" also comprises, in
   this context, liability to punishment. Now, among the
   inalienable rights of every member of the Islamic
   society --Muslim and non-Muslim alike-- is the right to
   protection (in every sense of the word) by the
   community as a whole. As is evedent from innumerable
   Qur'anic ordinances as well as the Prophet's injuctions
   forthcoming from authentic Traditions, every citizen is
   entitled to a share in the community's economic
   resources and thus, to the enjoyment of social
   security: in other words, he or she must be assured of
   an equitable standard of living commensurate with the
   resource at the disposal of the community. For,
   although the Qur'an makes it clear that human life
   cannot be expressed in terms of physical existence
   alone --the ultimate values of life being spiritual in
   nature-- the believers are not entitled to look upon
   spiritual truths and values as something that could be
   divorced from the physical and social factors of human
   existence. In short, Islam envisages and demands a
   society that provides not only for the spiritual needs
   of man, but for his bodily and intellectual needs as
   well. It follows, threfore, that --in order to be truly
   Islamic-- a society (or a state) must be so constituted
   that every individual, man and woman, may enjoy that
   minimum of material well-being and security without
   which there can be no human dignity, no real freedom
   and, in the last resort, no spiritual progress: for,
   there can be no real happiness and strength in a
   society that permits some of its members to suffer
   undeserved want while others have more than the need.
   If the whole society suffers privations owing to
   circumstances beyond its control (as happened, for
   instance, to the Muslim community in the early days of
   Islam), such shared privations may become a source of
   spiritual strength and, through it, of future
   greatness. But if the available resources of a
   community are so unevenly distributed that certain
   groups within it live in affluence while the majority
   of the people are forced to use up all their energies
   in search of their daily bread, poverty becomes the
   most dangerous enemy of spiritual progress, an
   occasionally drives whole communities away from
   God-consciousness and into the arms of soul-destroying
   materialism. It was undoubtedly this that the Prophet
   had in mind when he uttered the warning woeds (quoted
   by al-Suyuti in al-Jami al-Saghir), "Proverty may well
   turn into a denial of the truth (kafr)." Consequently,
   the social legislation of Islam aims at a state of
   affair in which every man, woman and child has (a)
   enough to eat and wear, (b) an adequate home, (c) equal
   opportunities and facilities for education, and (d)
   free medical care in health and sickness. A corollary
   of these rights is the right to productive and
   remunerative work while of working age and in good
   health, and a provision (by the community or the state)
   of adequate nourishment, shelter, etc. in cases of
   disability resulting from illness, widowhood, enforeced
   enemployment, old age, or under-age. As already
   mentioned, the communal obligation to create such a
   comprehensive social security scheme has been laid down
   in many Qur'anic verses, and has been amplified and
   explained by a great number of the Prophers
   commandments. It was the second Caliph, Umar ibn
   al-Khattab, who began to translate these ordinances
   into a concrete administrative scheme (see Ibn Said,
   Tabagat, III/1. 213-217); but after his premature
   death, his successors had either the vision nor the
   statemanship to continue his unfinished work.
   
   It is against the background of this social security
   scheme envisaged by Islam that the Qur'an imposes the
   severe sentence of hand-cutting as a deterrent
   punishment for robbery. Since, under the circumstances
   outlined above, "temptation" cannot be admitted as a
   justifiable excuse, and since, in the last resort, the
   entire socioeconomic system of Islam is based on the
   faith of its adherents, its balance is extremely
   delicate and in need of constant, strictly enforced
   protection. In a community in which everyone is assured
   of full security and social justice, any attempt on the
   part of an individual to achieve an easy, unjustified
   gain at the expense of other members of the community
   must be considered an attack against the system as a
   whole, and must be punished as such: and, therefore,
   the above ordinance which lays down that the hand of
   the thief shall be cut off. One must, however, always
   hear in mind the principle mentioned at the beginning
   of this note: namely, the absolute interdependence
   between man's right and corresponding duties (including
   liability to punishment). In a community or state which
   neglects or is unable to provide complete social
   security for all its members, the temptation to enrich
   onself by illegal means often becomes irresistible
   --and, consequently, theft cannot and should not be
   punished as severely as it should be punished in a
   state in which social security is a reality in the full
   sense of the woed. If the society is unable to fulfil
   its duties with regard to everyone of its memebers, it
   has not right to invoke the full sanction of criminal
   law (had) against the individual transgressor, but must
   confine itself to milder forms of administrative
   punishment. (Its was in correct appreciation of this
   principle that the great Caliph Umar waived the had of
   handcutting in a period of famine which afflicted
   Arabia during his reign.) To sum up, one may safely
   conclude that the cutting-off of a hand in punishment
   for theft is applicable only within the context of an
   already existing fully-functioning social security
   scheme, and in no other circumstances.[30]
 
Fiqh sangat erat kaitan dengan Syari'ah, jika  bukannya  malah
identik  (seperti  menurut pengertian kebanyakan orang). Ahmad
Zaki  Yamani,   dalam   sebuah   risalahnya   yang   terkenal,
memperjelas  persoalan  Syari'ah  itu  dalam  kaitannya dengan
hasil karya para ulama terdahulu  yang  secara  keseluruhannya
biasanya  dipandang  sebagai korpus Hukum Islam. Perhatikanlah
bagaimana Yamani menegaskan,  hasil  pemikiran  ("fiqh"  dalam
arti   asalnya)  para  ulama  dalam  kitab-kitab  itu  baginya
tidaklah mengikat,  karena  pemikiran  itu  tidak  lepas  dari
tuntutan  zaman  dan  tempat  yang  lebih spesifik, yang belum
tentu cocok dengan tuntutan zaman kita sekarang.  Sama  dengan
yang  di  atas, di sini kami kutipkan sepenuhnya uraian Yamani
(namun, sekali lagi, maaf tidak sempat menerjemahkannya):
 
   The Islamic Shari'a as a phrase has two scope of
   meanings. Generally and widely construed, it denotes
   everything that has been written by Moslem jurists
   throughout the centuries, whether it dealt with
   contemporaneous issues of the time or in anticipation
   of future ones. The jurists derived their principles
   from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (way of action and the
   opinions of the Prophet), and from the other sources of
   Shari'a such as Ijma' (the consensus of the community
   represented by its scholars and learned men), and
   public interest considerations. The Shari'a, looked
   upon in this wide scope, constitutes a huge Juristic
   tradition the value of which depends on the individual
   jurist himself, his era, or even the particular problem
   confronting him. As such the system has a tremendous
   scholastic value to the Moslem, however, it has no
   binding authority; since within it one might find
   different, and sometimes contradictory principles
   resolving the same issues depending on the Juristic
   school that propagated the principle. Furthermore, it
   cannot have a binding authority since circumstances
   that brought about a certain principle might not be in
   existence any more, and surely we cannot maintain that
   previous Moslem Jurists have anticipated all our
   existing contemporary problems. Yet, as I said before
   in this wide sense, one cannot deny the Shari'a
   scholastic value as an elaborate system of deduction
   which should be relied upon for future derivations of
   principles.
   
   Construed narrowly, the Shari'a is confined to the
   undoubted principles of the Qur'an, to what is true and
   valid of the Sunna, and the consensus of the community
   represented by its sholars and learned men during a
   certain period and regarding a particular problem,
   provided such consensus was possible. Viewed as such,
   the Shari'a has a binding authority on every Moslem,
   and he is obligated to follow and employ it to solve
   his affairs ...
   
   The importance of differentiating between the wide and
   the narrow scope of Shari'a is evident in countries
   that fully implement the system, such as the Kingdom of
   Saudi Arabia. As I explained earlier, not all the
   principles of Shari'a in its wider sense are of a
   binding authority, because of certain inherent
   difficulties in attempting to harmonize some of them.
   Furthermore, one cannot choose one juristic school for
   implementation to the exclusion of all others, which
   was done in the past, since as a logical consiquence on
   would have to maintain the princiles of the other
   schools are not valid, or at least, are not worthy of
   being followed.
   
   According to the well-known Shari'a principle "the
   validity of that on which there is a difference can be
   questioned, but not the validity of that on which there
   is consensus," it becomes imperative ... to adopt the
   narrow meaning of Shari'a, confined to the Qur'an, the
   Sunna, and consensus, then, select principles from the
   various juristic schools with no exceptions, the
   criterion being what is more appropriate to the needs
   of that particular country. Such countries could
   legislate new solutions for novel problems, deriving
   such solutions from the general principles of the
   Shariia and considerations of public interest and
   communal welfare. [31]
 
--------------------------------------------   (bersambung 4/4)
Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah
Editor: Budhy Munawar-Rachman
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