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IV.29. PANDANGAN KONTEMPORER TENTANG FIQH (3/4) Telaah Problematika hukum Islam di Zaman Modern Oleh Nurcholish Madjid BEBERAPA CONTOH PEMIKIRAN KONTEMPORER FIQH Kita telah pergi sejauh yang diperlukan, untuk membahas masalah-masalah pokok yang mendasari pemikiran kontemporer tentang fiqh. Berbagai pemikiran mutakhir tentang fiqh menegaskan perlunya kesadaran akan pesan dasar Islam sebelum suatu hukum atau hukuman dilaksanakan. Kesadaran itu dapat disebut sebagai karakteristik pemikiran fiqh dan hukum Islam di zaman modern. Di sini akan dikemukakan contoh pemikiran para intelektual Islam mutakhir, dari tiga tokoh yang representatif, yaitu Fat'hi 'Utsman (pemimpin redaksi majalah Islam internasional Arabia yang terbit di London), Muhammad Asad (salah seorang arsitek dan pemikir konstitusi Negara Islam Pakistan), dan Ahmad Zaki Yamani (yang pernah menjabat Menteri Perminyakan Saudi Arabia dan tokoh OPEC yang amat terkenal). Fatthi 'Utsman menegaskan, suatu hukum, termasuk yang ada dalam al-Qur'an dapat dilaksanakan hanya setelah ditegakkannya keadilan sosial dan tatanan kemasyarakatan yang menjamin anggotanya untuk tidak melanggar ketentuan yang ditetapkan. Kami kutipkan dan terjemahkan sepenuhnya pendapat Fat'hi 'Utsman yang relevan, dari bukunya, al-Din li al-Waqi' (Agama untuk Realita): Keadilan Sosial sebelum hukuman. Allah menerangkan dalam Kitab-Nya berbagai hukuman kejahatan (had) seperti, misalnya, hukum bunuh (qishash) untuk kejahatan pembunuhan, potong tangan untuk pencurian, dan lain-lainnya. Wajar bahwa Islam menempuh jalan penetapan hukum-hukum setelah ditempuhnya jalan pengarahan pikiran melalui aqidah dan pendidikan tingkah laku melalui prinsip tabadul. Tapi penetapan hukum Islam tidak pernah disebut kecuali mesti timbul dalam pikiran orang, gambaran yang mengerikan tentang tangan-tangan buntung dan jasad-jasad berserakan. Sedangkan yang sebenarnya ialah bahwa rahmat Allah untuk sekalian alam tidaklah menetapkan hukuman, kecuali sesudah ditempuh jalan proteksi, sama dengan yang dikatakan Francis Aveling dalam bukunya ilmu Jiwa Klasik dan Modern, "Kalau tujuan kita ialah kebaikan masyarakat, maka tujuan hukuman haruslah proteksi. Dan cara apapun yang dapat merealisasikan tujuan ini harus dipandang sebagai wajar dari sudut pandangan sosial. Jadi jika kita dapat mencegah sebab-sebab dan situasi yang mendorong kejahatan, baik yang berasal dari lingkungan atau pun dari pribadi sendiri, maka itulah cara yang ideal yang kita wajib menggunakannya." Dalam praktek memang telah terjadi berbagai usaha ke arah ini melalui berbagai pengabdian sosial. Tapi kalau seandainya seluruh situasi yang berkaitan dengan lingkungan telah tersedia dengan sebaik-baiknya, maka tentulah yang tersisa bagi kita ialah memikirkan sebab-sebab individual yang mendorong orang untuk melakukan pelanggaran-pelanggaran. Dari sini kita melihat, Islam ketika menetapkan pelaksanaan qishash dalam kejahatan pembunuhan, ia bersama itu juga menetapkan langkah-langkah yang menjamin hilangnya dorongan-dorongan permusuhan golongan, kelompok atau perbedaan tingkat sosial. Dan ketika menetapkan hukuman potong tangan pencuri, maka Islam tidaklah melakukan hal itu sebelum tegaknya hak-hak hidup pribadi dan mantapnya tanggung negara untuk menjamin hak-hak pribadi itu. Dan ketika Islam menetapkan hukum rajam atau cambuk atas pezina, maka sesungguhnya ia juga menetapkan kemudahan jalan perkawinan dan melindungi bagian-bagian privat dari tubuh dengan menutup aurat dan menjaga penglihatan mata, serta melarang khalwat (kencan seorang lelaki dan seorang perempuan yang bukan muhrim, namun tanpa muhrim perempuan itu). Jadi pengaturan sosial berjalan seiring atau mendahului penetapan hukuman kejahatan.[29] Lebih runtut lagi adalah jalan pikiran dan garis argumen Muhammad Asad. Dalam memberi penjelasan tentang makna yang lebih mendasar di balik hukuman yang amat keras bagi pencuri (potong tangan), Asad membuat uraian panjang lebar. (Di sini kami kutipkan seluruh uraian itu, namun maaf tidak sempat menerjemahkan): The extreme severity of this Qur'anic punishment can be understood only if one bears in mind the fundamental principle of Islamic Law that no duty (taklif) is ever imposed on man without his being granted a coresponding right (haq); and the term "duty" also comprises, in this context, liability to punishment. Now, among the inalienable rights of every member of the Islamic society --Muslim and non-Muslim alike-- is the right to protection (in every sense of the word) by the community as a whole. As is evedent from innumerable Qur'anic ordinances as well as the Prophet's injuctions forthcoming from authentic Traditions, every citizen is entitled to a share in the community's economic resources and thus, to the enjoyment of social security: in other words, he or she must be assured of an equitable standard of living commensurate with the resource at the disposal of the community. For, although the Qur'an makes it clear that human life cannot be expressed in terms of physical existence alone --the ultimate values of life being spiritual in nature-- the believers are not entitled to look upon spiritual truths and values as something that could be divorced from the physical and social factors of human existence. In short, Islam envisages and demands a society that provides not only for the spiritual needs of man, but for his bodily and intellectual needs as well. It follows, threfore, that --in order to be truly Islamic-- a society (or a state) must be so constituted that every individual, man and woman, may enjoy that minimum of material well-being and security without which there can be no human dignity, no real freedom and, in the last resort, no spiritual progress: for, there can be no real happiness and strength in a society that permits some of its members to suffer undeserved want while others have more than the need. If the whole society suffers privations owing to circumstances beyond its control (as happened, for instance, to the Muslim community in the early days of Islam), such shared privations may become a source of spiritual strength and, through it, of future greatness. But if the available resources of a community are so unevenly distributed that certain groups within it live in affluence while the majority of the people are forced to use up all their energies in search of their daily bread, poverty becomes the most dangerous enemy of spiritual progress, an occasionally drives whole communities away from God-consciousness and into the arms of soul-destroying materialism. It was undoubtedly this that the Prophet had in mind when he uttered the warning woeds (quoted by al-Suyuti in al-Jami al-Saghir), "Proverty may well turn into a denial of the truth (kafr)." Consequently, the social legislation of Islam aims at a state of affair in which every man, woman and child has (a) enough to eat and wear, (b) an adequate home, (c) equal opportunities and facilities for education, and (d) free medical care in health and sickness. A corollary of these rights is the right to productive and remunerative work while of working age and in good health, and a provision (by the community or the state) of adequate nourishment, shelter, etc. in cases of disability resulting from illness, widowhood, enforeced enemployment, old age, or under-age. As already mentioned, the communal obligation to create such a comprehensive social security scheme has been laid down in many Qur'anic verses, and has been amplified and explained by a great number of the Prophers commandments. It was the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, who began to translate these ordinances into a concrete administrative scheme (see Ibn Said, Tabagat, III/1. 213-217); but after his premature death, his successors had either the vision nor the statemanship to continue his unfinished work. It is against the background of this social security scheme envisaged by Islam that the Qur'an imposes the severe sentence of hand-cutting as a deterrent punishment for robbery. Since, under the circumstances outlined above, "temptation" cannot be admitted as a justifiable excuse, and since, in the last resort, the entire socioeconomic system of Islam is based on the faith of its adherents, its balance is extremely delicate and in need of constant, strictly enforced protection. In a community in which everyone is assured of full security and social justice, any attempt on the part of an individual to achieve an easy, unjustified gain at the expense of other members of the community must be considered an attack against the system as a whole, and must be punished as such: and, therefore, the above ordinance which lays down that the hand of the thief shall be cut off. One must, however, always hear in mind the principle mentioned at the beginning of this note: namely, the absolute interdependence between man's right and corresponding duties (including liability to punishment). In a community or state which neglects or is unable to provide complete social security for all its members, the temptation to enrich onself by illegal means often becomes irresistible --and, consequently, theft cannot and should not be punished as severely as it should be punished in a state in which social security is a reality in the full sense of the woed. If the society is unable to fulfil its duties with regard to everyone of its memebers, it has not right to invoke the full sanction of criminal law (had) against the individual transgressor, but must confine itself to milder forms of administrative punishment. (Its was in correct appreciation of this principle that the great Caliph Umar waived the had of handcutting in a period of famine which afflicted Arabia during his reign.) To sum up, one may safely conclude that the cutting-off of a hand in punishment for theft is applicable only within the context of an already existing fully-functioning social security scheme, and in no other circumstances.[30] Fiqh sangat erat kaitan dengan Syari'ah, jika bukannya malah identik (seperti menurut pengertian kebanyakan orang). Ahmad Zaki Yamani, dalam sebuah risalahnya yang terkenal, memperjelas persoalan Syari'ah itu dalam kaitannya dengan hasil karya para ulama terdahulu yang secara keseluruhannya biasanya dipandang sebagai korpus Hukum Islam. Perhatikanlah bagaimana Yamani menegaskan, hasil pemikiran ("fiqh" dalam arti asalnya) para ulama dalam kitab-kitab itu baginya tidaklah mengikat, karena pemikiran itu tidak lepas dari tuntutan zaman dan tempat yang lebih spesifik, yang belum tentu cocok dengan tuntutan zaman kita sekarang. Sama dengan yang di atas, di sini kami kutipkan sepenuhnya uraian Yamani (namun, sekali lagi, maaf tidak sempat menerjemahkannya): The Islamic Shari'a as a phrase has two scope of meanings. Generally and widely construed, it denotes everything that has been written by Moslem jurists throughout the centuries, whether it dealt with contemporaneous issues of the time or in anticipation of future ones. The jurists derived their principles from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (way of action and the opinions of the Prophet), and from the other sources of Shari'a such as Ijma' (the consensus of the community represented by its scholars and learned men), and public interest considerations. The Shari'a, looked upon in this wide scope, constitutes a huge Juristic tradition the value of which depends on the individual jurist himself, his era, or even the particular problem confronting him. As such the system has a tremendous scholastic value to the Moslem, however, it has no binding authority; since within it one might find different, and sometimes contradictory principles resolving the same issues depending on the Juristic school that propagated the principle. Furthermore, it cannot have a binding authority since circumstances that brought about a certain principle might not be in existence any more, and surely we cannot maintain that previous Moslem Jurists have anticipated all our existing contemporary problems. Yet, as I said before in this wide sense, one cannot deny the Shari'a scholastic value as an elaborate system of deduction which should be relied upon for future derivations of principles. Construed narrowly, the Shari'a is confined to the undoubted principles of the Qur'an, to what is true and valid of the Sunna, and the consensus of the community represented by its sholars and learned men during a certain period and regarding a particular problem, provided such consensus was possible. Viewed as such, the Shari'a has a binding authority on every Moslem, and he is obligated to follow and employ it to solve his affairs ... The importance of differentiating between the wide and the narrow scope of Shari'a is evident in countries that fully implement the system, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As I explained earlier, not all the principles of Shari'a in its wider sense are of a binding authority, because of certain inherent difficulties in attempting to harmonize some of them. Furthermore, one cannot choose one juristic school for implementation to the exclusion of all others, which was done in the past, since as a logical consiquence on would have to maintain the princiles of the other schools are not valid, or at least, are not worthy of being followed. According to the well-known Shari'a principle "the validity of that on which there is a difference can be questioned, but not the validity of that on which there is consensus," it becomes imperative ... to adopt the narrow meaning of Shari'a, confined to the Qur'an, the Sunna, and consensus, then, select principles from the various juristic schools with no exceptions, the criterion being what is more appropriate to the needs of that particular country. Such countries could legislate new solutions for novel problems, deriving such solutions from the general principles of the Shariia and considerations of public interest and communal welfare. [31] -------------------------------------------- (bersambung 4/4) Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah Editor: Budhy Munawar-Rachman Penerbit Yayasan Paramadina Jln. Metro Pondok Indah Pondok Indah Plaza I Kav. UA 20-21 Jakarta Selatan Telp. (021) 7501969, 7501983, 7507173 Fax. (021) 7507174 |
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